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Principles of Anti-Discriminatory Design
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Abstract—Technical design can produce exclusionary and
even discriminatory effects for users. A lack of discriminatory
intent is insufficient to avoid discriminatory design, since implicit
assumptions about users rarely include all relevant user
demographics, and in some cases, designing for all relevant users
is actually impossible. To minimize discriminatory effects of
technical design, an actively anti-discriminatory design
perspective must be adopted.
This article provides examples of discriminatory user
exclusion, then defining exclusionary design in terms of
disaffordances and dysaffordances. Once these definitions are in
place, principles of anti-discriminatory design are advanced,
drawing upon a method of phenomenological variation employed
in the context of standpoint epistemology.
Keywords—design; affordances; discrimination; race; gender;
religion; engineering

I. INTRODUCTION
Technological design cannot possibly accommodate every
user, but there are clear cases where the line is crossed from
mere loss of functionality to discriminatory user exclusion, as
recognized legally through e.g. ADA compliance and as
recognized socially through e.g. popular rejection of so-called
“flesh colored” crayons. This paper constructs a theory of
disaffordances and dysaffordances that identifies forms of
exclusion which are materially or socially exclusive in ways
which can rise to the level of discrimination, then
recommending principles which may aid in proactively antidiscriminatory design processes.
II. USER EXCLUSION AND THE DISCRIMINATORY THRESHOLD
The exclusion of some users seems inevitable in many
design contexts, and in many of these cases user exclusion is
not discriminatory. A clothing designer, for the most part,
designs an article of clothing as conforming with male or
female gendered norms for self-presentation, and it would
clearly be a misconstrual of an appropriate understanding of
discriminatory design to fault a woman’s dress or blouse for
failing to afford men’s gender-typical self-presentation. Here,
patterns of user behavior require design targeted at a distinct
user demographic, and require such targeting to take place in a
way which tends to be exclusionary of other demographics.
It is less clearly non-discriminatory if a designer chooses to
produce, for example, clothing not only for women in

particular, but for very thin women in particular, since here
norms of user behavior do not delimit the design space: making
a particular dress design in a large variety of sizes may require
creativity and artfulness in order to give the right effect for all
wearers, but it does not present either the same degree or the
same kind of problem as designing a dress to be gender-typical
clothing for a variety of gender presentations. Clothing,
however, can be obtained from a great variety of designers
without significantly compromising its functionality for the
user, and there are designers enough to provide reasonable
access to the ability to clothe oneself to the variety of kinds of
user embodiment, with the possible exception of those persons
whose bodies are at the upper limits of humanly possible size.
It may be that designers cluster in the design space that caters
to privileged body types, producing more variety and
availablity to some rather than others, but it seems perhaps an
overstrong claim to describe this effect as discriminatory.
By contrast, were a company to require job applications to
be submitted via an online system which was incompatible
with screen readers—assuming that being sighted was not a
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)—this would be
clearly discriminatory, as it would remove eligibility for
employment for a non-employment-related reason. The
difference (1) is not merely in ease of access, but in access
itself; (2) does not reflect a difference in user demographics
that requires distinct provision of services to distinct
demographics; and (3) cannot be accommodated through
multiple equivalent providers of service, since employers
provide substantially different opportunities to employees,
unlike e.g. clothes which perform at least their primary
functions with little difference between available brand names.
These examples illustrate a threshold which separates
exclusion which is (a.i) pragmatically necessary or (a.ii)
optional but unproblematic from exclusion which is (b.)
discriminatory. Here, we see the discriminatory impact arise
even while considering the technical interface with the user in
isolation from compounding social factors. When we consider
compounding social factors as well, we can see that
discriminatory effects can be created even in the absence of all
three of the factors initially identified above.
A classic example of discriminatory design is the BandAid. The original and standard color of the Band-Aid seems
designed to appear inconspicuous when placed on the skin of
some but not all users. It could be argued that this is akin to
designing clothes for either male or female gender

presentation: the user demographics provide a forced choice,
since the product function will be broken for either light- or for
dark-skinned users, depending on whether a dark or light skin
tone is used for the product’s color. Given the forced choice, it
seems then unproblematic to choose to accommodate the
majority rather than a minority of users. However, the fact that
all brands of commercially available adhesive bandages made
this same individual determination to cater to the majority
creates an emergent problem: access to this function is denied
upon racial lines.
This itself is not a major concern. The primary function of
the adhesive bandage is not related to its color, and remains
accessible for all users, and the disadvantage of diminished
skin color similarity presents little substantial impact on
anyone’s life, considered in isolation. Moments in our lives are
not, however, experienced in isolation, and neither can they be
properly understood in isolation. The widespread and historical
prejudices against those with darker skin provide a context
which gives this denial of functionality greater weight, as does
the specific practice—now thankfully in the past—of calling a
specific white-normative pinkish-grey color “flesh color,”
making dark-skinned persons unable to name the color of their
own flesh as flesh. The exclusionary effect of the adhesive
bandage not only appears within these contexts, but creates a
further context: it is yet another small moment in a system of
separate and unequal accommodation and access. We can see
the impact of social and historical context by imagining that
Band-Aid had chosen an umber color instead—this design
choice may have seemed curious, but would not have been
grounds for any serious complaint of discrimination. I suspect
that it may not have occurred to many white users of the umber
bandage that it had been intended to be flesh-colored at all.
In the initial case of the job applicant, we saw (b.i) a direct
substantial discriminatory effect. In this second case, we might
say that the substantial discriminatory effect is (b.ii) indirect
and emergent; it only becomes substantial when we consider
the design choices throughout the population of service
providers, and within the social and historical context of user
communities.
These considerations do not give us any clear list of
necessary and sufficient conditions for determining which
forms of user exclusion are properly regarded as
discriminatory, but instead are intended only to give us a sense
of scope and scale. Any abstract theory might be able to
establish limit cases, but is very likely, by its nature, to be
unable to address all the factors which would go into
determining whether a given questionable case is
unproblematically
exclusionary
or
problematically
discriminatory. It is sufficient to our purposes if this section
has established that thresholds exist past which exclusionary
design choices are no longer necessary or acceptable but
problematic and discriminatory, and that these thresholds vary
according to the social context of user groups. This allows us
to proceed to a consideration of non-affordances which
produce exclusionary effects, and to do so with special
attention to those such effects which are exclusionary to groups
subject to normative exclusion on the basis of e.g. race, gender,
sexual orientation, religion, or disability.

III. NON-AFFORDANCES
The language of “affordances” has become widespread in
engineering as well as interdisciplinary fields including
Design Studies, Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), Science
and Technology Studies (STS), and Internet Studies, but there
has been little discussion of non-affordances. Gibson [1] is the
originator of the conceptual structure of “affordances,” and
Norman is its most influential popularizer [2][3], but neither
discusses non-affordances in a systematic or theorized way.
Among the great many authors working with this conceptual
structure, only a very few make use of the terms “nonaffordance” or “disaffordance,” and none provides either a full
definition or a discussion of the scope and variety of cases
falling under either term. Gee mentions “disaffordances” in
conjunction with “affordance” without providing a definition
for the term or any discussion of the concept in isolation, but
usefully pointing out that “affordances and disaffordances do
not reside in the world alone, but in the combination of the
specific mind/body [the player-character] brings to the that
world and the way in which that world encourages or
discourages that specific mind/body in terms of possible
actions” [4][5]. Marcus introduces the term on his own, but
credits Gibson [1] for tacitly putting forth the idea, and gives
us a bit more of a definition: “As Gibson notes ([1], p. 37),
this can also concern the creation of obstacles in the
environment, a form of ‘disaffordance’, to protect from or
exclude other species or members of the own species, why we
here also can sense a potential political dimension to the
concept” [6].
No doubt it will be objected that, while the discussion of
non-affordances and disaffordances in the scholarly record may
be vanishingly infrequent, there is an obvious and implicit
understanding of the idea. For example, consider the entire first
chapter of Norman’s most famous book [2], or even just
Carelman’s “Coffeepot for Masochists”—the coffeepot with its
spout pointing backwards toward its handle that Norman
discusses in the first pages of the book, and which even
appears on the cover of my edition. Norman’s discussion,
however—both in this first chapter and elsewhere—looks only
at failed affordances in order to inform his analysis of
successful affordances.
A merely negative account of non-affordances cannot
distinguish between kinds of failures—those which for
example arise between the product and its function versus
those which arise between the user and the product—and a
positive account of various disaffordances is needed to fully
address the challenges of design, and, in particular, to address
our topics in this paper: when design problems become
discriminatory, and how to avoid discriminatory design.
IV. A TYPOLOGY OF NON-AFFORDANCES
Thus far, following the two scholars I have found to have
previously used the term, I have used the term “disaffordance”
for the generic lack of affordances in design. We will now give
this term a specific definition within a typology of non-
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affordances which is targeted toward gaining an understanding
of how some forms of user exclusion can be discriminatory.
Still & Dark [7] provide a very good opening to this
discussion. They discuss Gaver’s [8] example of the cat door,
and note that, although we do not perceive it as an affordance
insofar as we are under no illusion that it would be a viable
pathway whereby we could go outside, “the affordance of
passage to another user (the cat) [is] recognized” [7]. They go
on to ask, “Is this an example of a perceived affordance?
Although an interesting philosophical discussion could be
generated in response to this question, our answer in this
context is no. In the design context, the action must apply to
the perceiver” [7]. It is this philosophical conversation which I
seek to generate, not to disagree with Still & Dark, but to
expand upon and draw distinctions within their “no,” and to
make clear that this and other non-affordances are of interest in
a design context.
To make sense of how the cat door can be perceived as
affordancing without being perceived as an affordance, we
need an idea of the normative construction of the user through
design. We see the cat door as a door either because we
recognize conventions that map design onto function [3] or
through imagining ourselves as differently embodied, just as
we might look at a scale model of a building and imagine it
inhabited by ants rather than humans [9]. The functions are
recognizable, and we can readily imagine from their form the
characteristics of the user necessary to encounter those
functions as affordancing, even though the tiny door affords us
no passage. This can occur when design normatively implies
afforded users from which we are physically excluded, like the
cat door, or when we are excluded through other constraints,
for example, social, cultural, or cognitive. Still & Dark [7]
provide another nice example of this latter variety: the child’s
understanding of chopsticks’ intended affordance of eating,
even when she has not learned to use them. Here, the child sees
the chopsticks as providing an in-principle affordance; the
design does not present an affordance to her, but it does present
an affordance to her imagined potential self.
Design presents functions relative to normatively implied
users, and our relation to the normatively implied user varies in
consequential ways. In the cat door and chopsticks cases, the
normatively implied user is unlike us in unproblematic ways,
for there are either alternate objects oriented to us that provide
us equivalent affordances (the human door), or we have clear
pathways to changing design intention into affordance which
are open more-or-less equally to all users like us (the
chopsticks to a skilled user). In the problematic cases with
which we are here concerned, the normatively implied user
constructed through design is exclusionary of some potential
users who are not otherwise appropriately accommodated and
who are not different from accommodated users in relevant
ways.
A. Non-Affordances and Poor Affordances
Let “non-affordance” refer to a general lack of an
affordance in question, where we understand “affordances” as
the perceptual presence of potential actions as such to an actor
by virtue of a given material context of practical action. Non-

affordances, then, can include lacks of affordance due to user
interface connection failures, e.g. using aural cues for deaf
users. This is importantly different from design failures—in
non-affordance, the object either does not appear in the user’s
phenomenological horizon at all, or it does not appear as
equipment [10] which carries with it a set of possible actions
and functions related to our projected action(s). But nonaffordances are not necessarily discriminatory, and the term
applies equally to the non-affordance of aural cues to the deaf
person’s receiving instructions and windows’ non-affordance
of infrared vision, or to a rock’s non-affordance of freshlybrewed coffee.
Let us then use the term “poor affordance” to refer to what
we most often call “bad design.” In this case, the affordance
does appear within the horizon of the user within the actornetwork [11]—in fact, it is only by virtue of this appearance
and with reference to it that the design of the object can be
poor! The poorness of the design consists in the presence of the
affordance, without, however, a clear and unobstructed
interface between its user or its object (or, in Floridi’s useful
terminology, its “prompter” [12]). Here, too, poor affordances
are not necessarily discriminatory, and this is where
Carelman’s ponderously designed coffeepot belongs in our
typology. As related to the previous example of aural cues for
deaf users, we might consider here written prompts for preliterate children as a relevant variation: written words are
present to toddlers, and are understood to be in-principle
communicative and informational in function, even though
these users may not personally be able to make them work.
B. Discriminatory Non-Affordances and Poor Affordances
Both non-affordances and poor affordances may be
discriminatory according to the understanding of
‘discriminatory design’ previously outlined. If, for example, a
website contains vital information in an image with no alt-text,
this is discriminatory to those with visual impairments, just like
having a sign containing safety warnings with no braille
translation or non-linguistic signalling of the danger—in either
case, the discriminatory effect arises from a non-affordance;
the entire non-appearance of the technical object in the user
horizon. The adhesive bandage provides an example of
discriminatory design arising from poor affordances: the “flesh
coloredness” of the bandage appears as an intended affordance1
1
I use the circumlocution ‘appears as an intended affordance’ in order to
avoid a contentious nest of issues which we will not be able to untangle in the
space of this article, but which should be at least acknowledged in passing.
The intentions of the designer to create this or that affordance are not
necessarily relevant to the creation of discriminatory effects—it is perceived
and effective affordances that are consequential, and these are subject to
multistability [13] and interpretive flexibility [14] within a cultural horizon
[15]. Material implications cannot be ignored, though, even on a constructivist
account of technical function, and I think a notion of a technical proper
function—adapted from Millikan’s notion of a biological proper function
[16]—is needed to give a good account of the social-material interplay which
gives rise to correctly perceived intended affordance. The account would
approximately be that a technical proper function is an affordance the
existence of which materially brings about the adoption, use, and replication
of the technical object. This account would have the additional advantage of
locating intended uses within the material conditions and genetic history of
the technical object rather than referring to a designer’s mental states,
allowing for circumstances where functional design may be replicated by
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even though companies now know that they shouldn’t use the
term “flesh color” to refer to white people’s average skin tone,
and it is the phenomenal presence of this intended function, in
conjuction with its demonstrable failure to interface with
darker-skinned users, which constructs the user’s color as nonnormative.

which produce perceived three-dimensionality through
parallax-motion systems rather than shape-from-shading: the
former system works well for most men but produces nausea in
many women, whose brains are more likely than men’s to use
the latter pattern to construct perceived three-dimensionality
[17].

Floridi’s discussion of the ‘Janus-headedness’ of the tool
[12] also helps to identify a distinction between discriminatory
design and unproblematic non-affordances and poor
affordances. The god Janus has two faces looking in different
directions, and Floridi compares the tool to the Janus head: one
(inter)face looks to the user; the other (inter)face looks to the
prompter—i.e. the element of the world which the tool is
responding to or modifying. It is the interface with the user
whose gaze can become more easily and obviously
discriminatory. If the bandage does not fit all or most wounds,
we say the design is poor, or that the design problem is difficult
(e.g. bandages interfacing with prompting wounds appearing
on knuckles and knees). The “flesh-coloredness” of the
bandage, however, gazes upon the user and recognizes whites
only; its affordances are designed to interface with users, but in
such a way that privileges one racial grouping at the exclusion
of others.

Disaffordances, in this novel and specific definition, can
follow from poor affordances with discriminatory effects, as in
the examples in the previous paragraph, but we have also
already seen examples of disaffordances which follow from
non-affordances: for example, the sign without braille or the
image without alt-text.

C. Disaffordances and Dysaffordances
The way that discriminatory design seems to arise from
user-(inter)facing poor affordances and non-affordances
indicates that we can gain additional clarity by looking at how
the object’s design fails to recognize its user. This distinction is
not of a kind with the distinction between non-affordance and
poor affordance: in that distinction, we looked at how the
object appears within the user’s horizon—here, by contrast, we
look at how the user appears within the object’s horizon.
Let “disaffordance” refer to an object which fails to
recognize relevant aspects of relevant users, resulting in either
non-affordances or poor affordances. We may think of the
stony gaze which the staircase directs toward the wheelchair
user, but without seeing her, or seeing her as unworthy of
responding to and interfacing with. We could also think of how
kitchen counters are designed for women’s average height, and
baby strollers are made so that a tall man (or an exceptionally
tall woman) must lean down, and must take care not to take too
long of a stride, since the brakes are often placed on the back of
the back wheels. These and other forms of female-oriented
design make many male homekeepers subtly but consistently
uncomfortable and frustrated. We can also think of VR systems
producers who do not fully understand the utilities and adaptations of
traditional designs which are reflexively and uncritically replicated.
The need for such an account is not “merely academic” in the colloquial
sense. Without a robust account of what affordances can be said to be rightly
and objectively perceived as intended, it is unclear how we can justifiably
distinguish between a poorly designed affordance and someone just using
something wrong. Hand-waving toward ‘perceived affordances’ may be fine
for our purposes here, but it does not properly establish the objective basis for
these judgments. If we are to give a complete account of how some but not all
logically possible affordances can be objectively identified as relevant when
not provided, a desk in a public office which cannot accommodate wheelchair
users must be describable as broken according to reasoning which is
simultaneously able to explain why the desk’s failure to accommodate
napping hyenas or naval military offensives does not make it broken.

Using a related but distinct prefix to name a related but
distinct phenomenon, let “dysaffordance” refer to an object
which not only fails to recognize relevant aspects of relevant
users, but which also requires users to misidentify themselves
in order to gain access to an object’s functions or products. The
Latin prefix “dis” usually names a lack or a separation; by
contrast, the Greek prefix “dys” usually names a malfunction
or problem—here, “disaffordance” refers to a design-based
separation from an object’s functionality based on user
identity, while “dysaffordance” refers to a design-based
requirement of certain users to misidentify themselves in order
to gain access to an object’s functionality.
Examples of dysaffordances abound, but seem necessarily
to fall entirely within the realm of poor affordances rather than
non-affordances. We may think of binarisms in user data entry
fields, requiring gender non-binary persons to choose between
male and female gender identities, and requiring bisexual
dating site users to (mis)identify themselves as either gay or
straight. We may think of SNS real-name policies, which often
require users to identify themselves in accordance with
governmental documentation rather than in accordance with
their
lived
identity—a
particularly
consequential
misidentification for transgender persons.
V. PRINCIPLES OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATORY DESIGN
The various kinds of discriminatory design problems
identified above can give us a sense of the scope and variety of
issues that the anti-discriminatory designer must guard against.
Consideration of this scope and variety will demonstrate the
necessity of taking a proactively anti-discriminatory approach
and the insufficiency of merely not being actively
discriminatory to the prevention of discriminatory effects. A
methodology for anti-discriminatory design can then be
recommended and described: producing discrimination impact
assessments through phenomenological variation oriented by
standpoint epistemology.
A. The Scope and Variety of Discriminatory Design Problems
In section II, we identified (b.i) direct and (b.ii) indirect
discriminatory effects, where in the former the discriminatory
effect arises from user exclusion from object functionality, and
in the latter the discriminatory effect arises from differential
user access to functionalities rather than outright exclusion. In
section IV.A. & B., we distinguished non-affordances from
poor affordances, where in the former some affordances do not
appear within some relevant users’ experience at all, and in the
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latter intended affordances do not provide actual affordances.
In section IV.C., we distinguished discriminatory
disaffordances from discriminatory dysaffordances, where in
the former the object fails to recognize relevant user identities
in a way that gives rise to direct (b.i) or indirect (b.ii)
discriminatory effects through either poor affordances or
through non-affordances, and in the latter the object both fails
to recognize some relevant user identities and also requires
some relevant users to actively misidentify themselves in order
to gain access to intended affordances.
In these overlapping distinctions we see three primary loci
of design problems: 1. The user’s phenomenal experience, in
which the object may be either present in a more-or-less
obstructive form, or simply absent; 2. The object’s implicit
construction of a user in its interface design, in which some
users may not be recognized or may be recognized poorly; and
3. The social context in which the user-object connection,
considered in either directionality (1. or 2.), takes place.
B. The Need for Anti-Discriminatory Design
The identification of these loci demonstrates the likely
insufficiency of a mere lack of discriminatory intent to prevent
discriminatory design. In (1.) and (2.), we can easily anticipate
how difficult it is, at each stage of the design process, to
imagine how the user interface will appear to all kinds of
users—persons of all races, language abilities, gender
identities, sexual orientations, religions, disabilities, ages, body
types, etc.—and how users among those groups and within the
intersectionalities that they present will experience the
interface. In (3.), we can see, further, how, even were this
kaleidoscopic imagining of all relevant users’ experience of
and through the interface successful, it would still be
insufficient to anticipate discriminatory effects which follow
from social histories and prior lived experience actuated by but
not contained within the interface. To use a blatant example:
thinking about what it’s like to be black can tell you that your
photobooth application ought to include brightness correction
to that a dark skin tone can be treated as the subject of the
portrait rather than being treated as “shadow,” balancing
exposure and contrast so that black people do not appear as
silouhettes. But, valuable as that consideration of how the
interface interfaces with users is, it won’t tell you why it would
upset some users if your app prompted the user to smile by
saying “Say fried chicken and watermelon!”—for this, we need
a history of racialized experience in the larger context in which
this interface appears.
The overwhelming diversity of user experiences, along
with the overwhelming difficulty of anticipating and
accounting for these user experiences, impresses upon us the
insufficiency of simply following established practices for nondiscriminatory design, such as ADA/508 compliance, to
prevent discriminatory design from occurring. Hence, we must
not be merely non-discriminatory designers, but actively antidiscriminatory designers. Even so, avoiding discriminatory
effects entirely during the design process seems impossible,
and being responsive to user complaints and requests in postrelease iterative redesign certainly seems to be a necessary
remediation. But still, we can become better at anticipating
discriminatory effects, and we have an obligation to do so even

if perfect anticipation of and design for all relevant user
experiences is impossible.
C. Methodology for Anti-Discriminatory Design
The importance of diversity in developer teams cannot be
ignored. Those who are marginalized or excluded by systems
of power and interpretation are better able to see those systems
at work than those who are privileged by them—privilege,
indeed, consists largely in the freedom from being required to
notice these systems at all. This point from feminist standpoint
epistemology—that marginalization produces locations of
epistemic advantage—is obviously relevant in a design
context. It seems common-sensical, for example, to assume
that very few, if any, black developers were involved in
programming a facial recognition system that was bad at
recognizing dark-skinned users [18], or an automated image
tagging system that identified black photographic subjects as
“gorillas” [19].
Diverse developer teams, however helpful, cannot present a
complete solution or a foolproof fix, for several reasons. First,
even those in locations of epistemic advantage may fail to
notice their own marginalization, since marginalizing
interpretations tend to be internalized by those marginalized by
them, this being, in fact, one of the primary pathways by which
marginalization occurs. Just because someone is a woman, for
example, it cannot be assumed that she will notice all instances
of sexism—for example, use of the generic “he” in
documentation discussing users of technical or professional
software—or that she will feel her voice legitimated enough
within the design context to express and insist upon addressing
these issues when they are noticed. Second, even if we could
count on all marginalized persons to be fully aware of their
own marginalization, and fully politicized such that they would
always insist on addressing such issues, no developer team
could be expected to be fully representative of the diversity of
identity groups and intersectionalities within the relevant user
base. Third, even if a developer team somehow were absolutely
diverse, absolutely self-aware, and absolutely politicized, such
a strategy for anti-discriminatory design wrongly implies that
the socially privileged designer has neither ability nor
responsibility to engage in anti-discriminatory design. In other
words, a developer working on her own should not excuse
herself from the responsibility to attempt to think through
diverse user experiences, and “Yeah, well I’m not Asian”
would not a satisfactory apology for e.g. designing image
recognition software that causes cameras to insist on repeatedly
asking many East Asian users “Did someone blink?” [20].
Aside from the obviously valuable but no-silver-bullet
method of increasing diversity in developer teams, antidiscriminatory design methods can be identified at micro- and
macro-levels, in order to address the both the user-object
interface (V.1. & 2. above) and the larger historical and social
context and impact (V.3. above).
At the micro-level, phenomenological variation, as
described by Ihde [13] will help in proactively antidiscriminatory design. In the process of phenomenological
variation, we begin with a given human-technics relation and
sucessively alter different aspects of the user and of the device
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in order to identify and articulate where and when alterations
of the human or of the device alter the human-technics relation
and its functionality. This cannot be reduced to ‘imagining
what it would be like to be a user, except [gay or latino or deaf
or etc. etc.]’. When we simply imagine being this or that
identity group we import our own sense of our own normality,
producing a bias against alternate user experiences, and we are
not likely to think through the concrete details of different
social and physical embodiments. The systematic
control/experiment group process of phenomenological
variation has a much better chance of noticing e.g. that using
contrast patterns in facial mapping may require different
programming for different skin tones, or that e.g. hosting
professional activities on Second Life may create troubling
dynamics given the relative unavailability of office-appropriate
clothing for female avatars in that virtual environment.
At the macro-level, Bush [21] has suggested conducting
gender impact assessment reports, akin to the environmental
impact assessment reports to which businesses have
(sometimes reluctantly) become accustomed. Here, I will
suggest a more general diversity impact assessment report, to
include the range of relevant diverse user groups rather than
gender alone. A population-wide and longitudinal impact
analysis of this kind is needed to identify emergent
discriminatory effects which may not be phenomenally present
in the interface itself in an isolated user interaction and, thus,
which phenomenological variation is unlikely to highlight. We
can find a fine example in the classic case of the FBI “Taco
Circuit” [22]. The FBI recognized and valued the Spanishlanguage skills that Hispanic agents often brought to the
agency, and assigned them tasks where those skills were
recognized and put to use. So far, so good! But as a result,
Hispanic agents were more often placed in secondary and
support roles, where they translated, interpreted, and
transcribed for their white colleagues who, because they had
lesser language skills on average, were placed in primary and
leadership roles where they were more able to gain recognition
and promotion. We can also consider another related but very
everyday example: calendar design. Scheduling all office
holidays and team deadlines so that they match with Christian
faith observance reduces opportunities from observant
members of non-Christian faiths, since their observance, unlike
that of their Christian coworkers, requires them to miss work,
to miss opportunities to play more central roles, and possibly to
be perceived as unreliable.
These techniques, though, are no substitute for robust
engagement with marginalized users and user communities,
and, although worth pursuing, are strongly limited by the
difficulty of anticipating and understanding the lived
experiences of others. When we try to imagine the experience
of others, we tend to imagine someone else as 'ourself +
[variation]'. The constancy of what we perceive as the ‘core’ or
‘true self’ fails to consider and account for the determination of
values and goals related to varying life experiences in ways we
fail to appreciate. These limitations are displayed clearly in the
discredited [23] practice of “disability simulation,” where, for
example, a nondisabled person is asked to navigate an
environment in a wheelchair in order, supposedly, to gain a
better understanding of the experiences of disabled persons.

These “simulations” produce an unrealistic understanding of
the life experience of disability for a number of reasons: the
nondisabled person does not have the alternate skill sets
developed by disabled persons, and thus overestimates the loss
of function which disability presents, and is furthermore likely
to think of able-normative solutions rather than solutions more
attuned to a disabled person's life experience. Similarly, even
when they proactively try to imagine and accommodate
architectural engagements of disabled persons, nondisabled
designers tend to enforce a bipedal-normative ablist agenda in
accomodation design, while by contrast, as Shew [24] points
out, conversations with wheelchair users may reveal less
interest in finding technologies which allow bipedal navigation
of able-normative architectures and more interest in altering
architectures to accommodate non-normative embodiments
which better represent disabled persons' preferred modes of
mobility and interaction.
Phenomenological variation and longitudinal impact
assessments can help to identify discriminatory design, but the
value of these practices is not only limited by, but is even
potentially significantly undermined by overestimation our
ability to understand and anticipate the life experiences of
others.
To conclude: Best practices for implementing antidiscriminatory design methodology—discussed here as
phenomenological variation and diversity impact assessment as
oriented by standpoint epistemology—will necessarily vary
widely, depending on what is being developed, and which
groups are most relevant and most at risk. I hope this
discussion is sufficient, though, to establish these guiding
principles of anti-discriminatory design:
•

Seek out diversity in developer teams, and give weight
and respect to marginalized perspectives especially
when they do not accord with normative (e.g.
white/male/straight/Christian/nondisabled/etc.)
perceptions.

•

Engage in systematic phenomenological variation to
identify problem areas in the user interface. Think
through differences relevant to social and physical
embodiments in areas of race, disability, gender,
religion, sexual orientation, transgender status, and
other areas as prompted by intended affordances.

•

Conduct population-wide and longitudinal diversity
impact assessments of potentially marginalized groups,
especially emphasizing groups identified as relevant
through phenomenological variation.

And, given the particular histories of many of the cases
brought up in the course of this discussion, we should also add:
•

Test with diverse users and be clear that you value and
are seeking out feedback related to their particular
experiences from their particular social and physical
embodiments.

•

Keep in mind that even all this will not catch every
problem. When something goes wrong, admit that it’s a
real problem, that the user is not wrong or unimportant,
and try to fix it.
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What’s most distressing about some of these cases is not
the discriminatory impact, or the designers’ failure to think
through user diversity, but instead the dismissive responses to
user complaints which explicitly restate what discriminatory
design says implicitly: You don’t count.
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